Ref. No 156/06/ZZ

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FINAL REPORT

Investigation into the incident of aircraft Beech 33 Bonanza, at TMA II Praha - Ruzyně airport on 11 May 2006

Prague November 2006

The present document is the translation of the Czech Investigation Report. Although efforts are made to translate it as accurate as possible, discrepancies may occur. In this case the Czech version is authentic.

A) Introduction

Operator:	Private
Aircraft type:	Beech, Be 33 Bonanza
Registration:	OY - GEV
Place of Incident:	TMA II Praha - Ruzyně airport (LKPR)
Date and Time:	11. 5. 2006, 14:57 (All times in this report are UTC)

B) Synopsis

On 11 May 2006 Czech Republic Air Accident Investigation Institute (AAII) received notification from the Air Traffic Control Centre of the Czech Republic of an incident involving a Beech 33 Bonanza airplane. The pilot of the plane, which was on the VFR flight from GERA – Leumnitz (EDAJ) to Bratislava (LZIB), entered FIR Praha without establishing contact with its respective ATC unit. North of the point of Rakovník at a level of 5500 ft he flew into TMA IV LKPR and then TMA II LKPR, without establishing prescribed two-way contact with his respective air traffic control centre (APP Praha), penetrating the control area of class C. The flight information centre failed to establish two-way communication with the unidentified airplane, which had entered FIR Praha before penetrating TMA IV LKPR. The pilot of the plane reported himself on the flight information centre frequency only after he had passed TMA III LKPR. Then he followed ATS instructions and continued flying under VFR to the destination aerodrome. Based on the notification, an investigation into the incident began.

The cause of the serious incident was investigated by an AAII commission comprising:

Investigator in charge: Members: Ing Stanislav Suchý Ing. Radomil Havíř

The Final report was released by:

AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION INSTITUTE Beranových 130 199 01 PRAHA 99

On the 5 December 2006.

C) The Final report includes the following main parts:


- 1) Factual information
- 2) Analysis
- 3) Conclusions
- 4) Safety recommendation
- 5) Annexes (to copy No.1 stored in AAII archive)

1 Factual information

1.1 History of the incident

On 11 May 2006 the pilot of the aircraft, registration OY-GEV, was on VFR flight from EDAJ airport to LZIB airport. At 14:47 hrs he entered FIR Praha in the airspace of Klingenthal point, without having established contact with its respective ATC unit and at level 5,500 ft continued in the route according to his filed FLP. FIC Praha dispatcher (FID) watched an unidentified aircraft with SSR code 0022 and based upon information from FPL he thought it could have been the OY-GEV. He tried in vain to establish two-way communication with the OY-GEV aircraft on frequency FIC Praha, and at 14:55 he informed the APP controller that the OY-GEV aircraft had not established two way contact and that its route north of the Rakovnik point was heading for TMA LKPR at level 5,500 ft.

At 14:58 the OY-GEV penetrated TMA IV LKPR at level 5,500 ft without establishing two way communication with APP Praha and continued flying to VOZ. At 15:02 the aircraft penetrated TMA II LKPR and at 15:09 TMA III Praha.



At 15:15 the pilot of the aircraft reported himself on frequency FID and established two-way communication. FID gave him an instruction to switch to SSR code and advised him of the regional QNH. At the same time FID informed the pilot that he had penetrated the control area TMA Praha without having established contact with APP Praha centre. The pilot said that before overflying from FIR München to FIR Praha he had contact with FIC München and received a frequency on which he was unable to establish contact. At 15:34 hrs FID instructed the pilot to change the frequency and contact APP Brno. The pilot continued in his flight under FPL. In a subsequent written report Prolonged Loss of Communication (PLOC) the pilot stated he had tried to establish contact on the airport's control tower frequency 118.1 MHz but no one had responded to his call.

1.2 Injuries to persons

NIL

1.3 Damage to aircraft

NIL

1.4 Other damage

NIL

1.5 Personnel information

The PIC, aged 64, holder of PPL(A), had a PIC qualification for the type F 33 A. He has flown total 2425 hours, on the type F 33 A total 410 hours.

1.6 Aircraft information

Type and Model:	F 33 A
Registration:	OY - GEV
Serial number:	CE 1370
Certificate of airworthiness:	valid until 20 July 2006
Total flight time:	2564 h

1.7 Meteorological information

According METAR was meteorological conditions during the incident at LKPR: Wind: 320°/ 6 kt Weather: CAVOK

1.5 Aids to navigation

Aids to navigation

1.6 Communications

Communications between the OY - GEV crew and air traffic service units at FIR Praha were maintained in turn on frequencies 126,1 MHz FIC Praha and 119,1 MHz APP Brno. The communication was legible.

1.10 Aerodrome information

NIL

1.11 Flight recorders

The OY – GEV aircraft was not equiped by flight recorders. The ATS records and radiocommunications were used for an analysis.

1.12 Description of incident site

NIL

1.13 Medical and pathological information

NIL

1.14 Fire

NIL

1.15 Survival aspects

NIL

1.16 Tests and research

NIL

1.17 Organizational and management information

NIL

1.18 Additional information

NIL

1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques

The incident has been investigated in accordance with Annex 13.

2 Analysis

2.1 It follows from the flight transcript that in flying from FIR München to FIR Praha the pilot did not keep to the relevant procedures for reporting his position when passing from one information region to the neighboring region. The pilot did no report himself on frequency FIC Praha on the FIR Praha border and at the level of 5,500 ft continued to fly on the route that headed for TMA LKPR, and at 14:58 hrs he entered the control area without APP Praha clearance. The attempt to establish contact, which the pilot allegedly made according to his PLOC statement, was not proved by the communication recording on TWR LKPR frequency.

2.2 FID tried to establish two way communication with the unknown airplane with SSR code 0022 three minutes before it had penetrated the control area and informed the APP Praha station about the situation. Separations from the unknown plane were maintained. FID did not ask ATS in the neighboring information region if they had some information about the flight with SSR code 0022, nor did he ask for help to establish contact with the unidentified aircraft.

2.3 The meteorological conditions were good enough for the pilot to determine his position in reference to FIR Praha and TMA II LKPR borders.

3 Conclusions

3.1 The commission has come to the following conclusions:

- The pilot of the aircraft was qualified and rated for the flight;
- The pilot did not keep to the right positioning procedures as he passed from one information region to the neighboring information region;
- Although the pilot did not establish two-way communication with respective ATS unit, he continued flying via the air path through the control area of class C and penetrated the control area without ATC clearance;
- The FID did try to establish contact with unknown aircraft and took steps adequate to traffic in TMA Praha.

3.2 The causes

The incident was caused by failure to establish contact with the respective ATS unit before penetrating the control area.

4 Safety recommendations

4.1 The following recommendation is made to crew:

If unable to establish contact on a new frequency, check all equipment settings and return to previous frequency if contact is not quickly established.